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Abstract 
  
Nigeria is purportedly at peace, yet, it is perennially embroiled in skirmishes that threaten its 
geo-stability. At the base of this dilemma is the mutational interface of religion and ethnicity in 
motorizing tension. The Nigerian media is not enamoured of the undercurrents that flow from 
this interaction. Rather, it is sucked into its centrifugal fold as it plays dialectic roles both as 
advocate of unity and champion of sectional interest in the country’s struggle to erect a cohesive 
national structure that is superior to ethno-religious allegiances. Thus, this paper examines the 
contradictions of state-building in Nigeria, the attendant elite deployment of primordial forces 
that are antithetical to peace and contends that the solution to the jigsaw puzzle of conflicts lies 
in the reinvention of the media to rise above the narrow boundaries of interethnic fusion erected 
by media-owning elite. 
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Introduction 
 
The atlas of peace in Nigeria is sketchy. Its sketchiness is rooted in the fluidity of 
underlying triggers of conflict. While conflicts in Nigeria manifest in four variants, namely, 
interethnic, intra-ethnic, ethno-religious and hybrid, involving the combination of the foregoing, 
they are motorized by tripartite entities of the state, the elite and the masses. The state fans the 
embers of violence through two failures: to put in place certain systemic safeguards that would 
conduce with peace; and, to live above the inherently destabilizing class war within the polity 
(Ibeanu 2003). Thus, the seeming partisanship of the state tends to undermine peace and create 
the necessary condition for the thriving of conflicts.  
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The culture of peace is neither native nor alien to any society or state formation. It is 
consciously cultivated, nurtured and entrenched. Culture of peace entails a deliberate and 
elaborate strategy, which facilitates the internalisation of those values, beliefs, behavioural 
patterns and norms that promotes peace. The culture of peace presupposes the mind-set of 
“reciprocal toleration and cooperative understanding of common aims, whether within or 
between any groups” (Igwe 2002:316-7). The emphasis of the Nigerian elite on nation-building 
as opposed to state-building creates a very serious crisis of loyalty that undermines national 
cohesion. This constitutes a key challenge to peace-making and peace consolidation in Nigeria. 
 
The elite-media linkage also reflects the aggregate character of the state. Despite the 
inherent social responsibility of the media to preach societal survival, it is limited by the 
dominant forces that give it its essence. Thus, the media mirrors the preferences of the elite. And 
its role in the matrix of peace and conflict is dictated by an overriding elite interest. There is a 
patent polarisation of opinions among the media organizations and this is energized by the 
tainted lens of ethnicity and religion as seen by the media-preneurs. This paper interrogates the 
roadblocks to the cultivation of a culture of peace and contends that the inherent systemic 
contradictions compromise the capacity of the media to spearhead peace.  
 
 
Geographical Expression: The Pursuit of Ethnic Agenda  
 
The process of integrating the disparate ethnic groups into a coherent national structure, 
which started in 1914 through the Lugardian amalgamation policy, was not consolidated by the 
time Nigeria was granted political independence in 1960. In other words, Nigeria was an 
unfinished and unconsolidated creation of the British. Before this decreed merger by the British 
overlords, these nationalities had independently existed and related with others within the 
framework of mutuality and self-generated ground rules. The 1914 unification, therefore, was 
externally driven rather than internally spawned. It is misleading to assert as Babawale (2007:15) 
did that “Nigeria, as we know it today, is an aggregation of several nationalities that have jointly 
agreed to co-exist as one nation.” The various ethnic groups that make up contemporary Nigeria 
were forcefully banded together and as such were not privy to, nor participated in, negotiating 
the basis for Nigerian statehood. The externality factor of the union and the internal rigidities 
prevalent in the operations of the Nigerian state constitutes a threat to its corporate survival. 
 
Although the foremost intention of Britain - possession of a wide geographical area and 
achievement of an economy of scale necessary to cut the cost of governance - was achieved, yet, 
a fundamental error in the mechanics of forging the Nigerian state was the absence of cross-
cutting ethos to anchor national identity. As Ademoyega (1981:1) contends, “British 
administrators did not make an effort to weld the country together and unite the heterogeneous 
group of people.” This position is quintessentially escapist in orientation as it seeks to absolve 
the Nigerian elite from culpability in Nigeria’s ethno-national integration crisis.  
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The post-independence Nigerian elite neglected to pursue a new strategy that would 
augment the shortfalls in the British integration models. Rather, they were content to be in the 
saddle of power as mere replacement of the erstwhile colonialists and to use state power for the 
promotion of “disruptive local loyalties” and advancement of personal aggrandisement (Ake 
1981; Suberu and Agbaje 1998; Nnoli 2003; Campbell, 2011). This imperfect integration 
spawned the seeds of disaffection that blossomed into perennial inter-ethnic conflicts for 
ascendancy.  
 
Thus, post-colonial Nigeria grappled with the question of statehood in the midst of ethnic 
fractionalisation. Everything happening at the political arena was interpreted from the prism of 
ethnicity. This was reinforced by the regionalisation of political parties and the absence of truly 
national parties. The key political figures theorised that the building blocks of the Nigerian state 
were the ethnic groups rather than individual citizens. The first decisive step to roll back the 
influence of ethnicity in the body politic was the banning of ethnic unions by the military shortly 
after the coup d’état that dismantled the First Republic. But this move did not yield the desired 
dividend as the state’s dereliction in meeting its obligations led to the re-modification of ethnic 
structures. As Ukiwo (2005:12) asserts,  
 
 
While pan-ethnic unions vanished, homeland associations 
continued to flourish. Pan-ethnic unions only became useful in the 
Diaspora where homeland associations could hardly be effective as 
a result of their insignificant membership. It was such dormant 
unions that were revitalised in the context of the ethno-religious 
conflicts from the mid-1980s. 
 
 
What gave room to this trend to thrive was the crisis of citizenship that pitched Nigerians 
against each other under the auspices of social categories of “natives” and “settlers” (Egwu 2005; 
Akanji 2012). The perception of the state as a source of wealth; and the intra-elite struggle to 
control its apparatus in order to advance their economic interests intensified the dichotomous 
designation of bona fide citizens as settlers and natives. 
 
All through the formative years of Nigeria, the emergent leaderships were not only 
ambivalent about forging statehood, but by their speeches, actions and mind-set, were 
pessimistic about the workability of a corporate Nigeria built on the pedestal of cross-ethnic 
ethos. Instead of transforming the diversities into a veritable asset, these became barriers to 
forging a macro-nationhood. Chief Awolowo, Tafawa Balewa, Ahmadu Bello, and Gowon 
variously doubted the basis for Nigerian unity (Douglas and Ola 2007). However, because of the 
charismatic and iconic symbolisation of these figures, generations of Nigerians built their mind-
set around these misgivings of a true federalist structure.  
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It is anachronistic and unhelpful to blame the British for the integration problems of 
Nigeria. The British forged the Nigerian state for its own convenience, what have the Nigerian 
elite done to transform the seemingly unfinished business into a vibrant nation-state? What the 
successive Nigerian elite did was to undermine the corporate survival of Nigeria by emphasizing 
its unworkability. Ahmadu Bello’s thesis of understanding the diversities as basis for unity was 
not seriously pursued. Emphases appeared to be in deepening diversities rather than bridging 
them. Fifty-two years of national existence have not blunted the lines of ethnicity; rather these 
years have sharply entrenched and accentuated them.  
 
 
Skewed Federalism, Ethnic Discord and Retreat of Peace  
 
The raison d’être, which underpinned Nigeria’s adoption of the federalist principles was 
principally to fuse the various ethnic groups into a seamless union. Federalism tends to blunt 
divisive factors and emphasize common grounds of unity. As Igwe (2002:154), opines, 
“federalism is the structural basis of the doctrine of unity in diversity”. The seeming innate 
coagulation properties in federalism appeared to underpin the position of the Willink 
Commission in 1958 appointed by the Nigerian colonial government to look into the fears of the 
minorities bordering on domination, and thus reported, “the minorities who have appeared before 
us have thought of separation as a remedy for their troubles. But unity might have the same 
effect, and though unity cannot be manufactured by a Commission, machinery can be devised 
which aims rather at holding the state together than at dividing it” (cited in Ojiakor 1981:44). 
 
The essential character of Nigerian federalism is that it is institutive, that is, it came into 
being through coerced imposition, as opposed to constitutive, the voluntary agreement of the 
constituent units (Igwe 2002). Hence, Nigerian federalism was not a product of negotiation and 
consensus. The first task of the immediate post-independence leadership, which ought to have 
been the conversion of Nigeria’s institutive federalism to constitutive federalist state, was 
shirked. Thus, the progression of Nigerian federalism towards the ideal typology (characterized 
by agreement amongst component units to enter into such a federation; clearly delineated 
assignment of powers; concession and retention of certain powers within designated spheres of 
influence) was scuttled. (Ijalaye 1979; Babawale 2007). And in actuality, Nigerian federalism 
consistently mutated away from the ideal typology to a hybrid version that is patently arbitrary, 
and as a result, successive military regimes superintended over the erosion of the federalist 
principles and the entrenchment of de facto unitarism. 
 
Nigeria’s contemporary skewed federalism appears to confirm the pre-independence fears 
of the minorities about marginalization. Although every ethnic group alleges marginalisation, 
including the big three, it is the minority ethnic groups, especially those domiciled in the oil-
bearing areas that have suffered most, especially in the wider context of national equation 
(Obianyo 2003).  
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Nigeria’s oil economy created an intricate web of parasitic state-units that reordered the fiscal 
distributive system previously anchored on the principles of derivation. The fiscal aspect of 
Nigerian federalism negatively mutated overtime as derivation formula plummeted from 50 
percent in 1960 to 13 percent in 1999 (Osipitan 2004). Thus, the mutation coincided with and 
was reflective of the change in the composition of Nigeria’s foreign exchange earners, and the 
more dominant oil became, the lesser the percentage was devoted to derivation. When Nigeria 
depended on a bouquet of primary commodities for its foreign exchange, the derivation principle 
played a critical role in calculating what accrued to the regions. Then, there was regional 
dispersion in the production of primary commodities with healthy competition among the 
regions. 
 
However, the shrinkage in the diversification of Nigeria’s foreign exchange earners and the 
trajectory to a mono-cultural perspective which created parasitic component units that no longer 
created, but merely consumed (Obi 1998). This consumerist disposition of the component units 
and the commandist and occupationist orientation of successive military regimes also distorted 
and skewed the federal system taking shape in the pre-military epoch. Hence, the beneficiaries of 
the contraction of the principles of derivative and the new revenue-sharing formula were the 
federal government and the unproductive component state-units (Olowononi 2003). And in other 
words, while the revenue allocation framework strengthened the federal government, it 
weakened the fiscal autonomy of the constituent units, especially the resource-bearing states.  
  
Thus, the agitation for resource control as an integral part of true federalism is a reaction to 
“decades of uninterrupted process of economic marginalization and political repression” 
orchestrated by the federal government (Anam-Ndu, 2007).  And today, the long drawn war 
between Niger Delta youth and the federal government flowed from this perception of 
marginalization as the depth of parasitism and reliance of the component state-units on oil money 
was exemplified in hard-line opposition to upward adjustment of the derivative principle during 
the National Political Reform Conference (NPRC) in 2006. And in the midst of the agitation by 
the South-South geopolitical zone for 50 percent derivation, Alhaji Ibrahim Hassan, the Second 
Republic Minister of Mines and Power and Member of the Northern delegation to the NPRC was 
quoted as saying: 
 
 
If anything is given to the South-South above 17%, then all the 
remaining 30 States and Abuja will be financially strangulated and 
pauperized. Unemployment in the country will increase. Crime 
will increase. Civil strife and disorder will increase and there will 
be no more money to pay even the staff of the States, except 
South-south, let alone money for any capital development in the 
country. …If they get 25% or 50% the rest of the States will get 
zero allocation (cited in Ikeji et al 2012:9-10). 
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Furthermore, adjunct to the issue of equitable revenue sharing formula was the rivalry 
surrounding the acquisition and exercise of federal power among the Nigerian elite, and in 
addition, the contraction of the federal space, the creation of imperial presidency and the 
enormous resources at the disposal of the federal government made the presidency extremely 
attractive, and thus, the quest for federal power is not purely to engender development, but to 
advance personal (economic) and group interest (Ake 1981). Thus, the continuing dependence of 
the Nigerian elite on state power as its main source of accumulation places high premium on it 
wherein they would go to any length to safeguard it, including mobilizing the masses and 
exploiting ethnic and religious prejudices (Babawale 2007).    
 
This distortion of the federalist principle and the recourse of the elite to religious and ethnic 
prejudices to advance their political agenda have had the effect of eroding peace in the polity. 
And the most radical demonstration of this was the institutionalization of political sharia in 
Northern Nigeria, starting with former Governor Yerima who implemented sharia in 2000, while 
other Northern states followed suit, and by 2001, almost all northern states were operating one 
form of sharia legal system or another (Iduh 2011; Berkeley Center 2013). And at the heels of 
this seeming de-secularization of the country were religious riots with far-reaching multiplier 
effects all over the country.    
 
 
One Year, One Conflict: Ubiquity of Conflicts and the Retreat of Peace 
 
The Nigerian polity enjoyed relative peace until the first two coups d’état in 1966 that 
ushered in military rule and civil war in tow. The ensuing crises were a horizontal fusion of 
political, ethnic and religious disaffection and etched the pattern of future conflicts in Nigeria. 
Perhaps, the effects of the civil war created conflict-weariness in the immediate post-civil war 
era. There was no real serious threat to peace except on the political turf where the military 
oligarchs engaged in the power game of coups d’état and counter coups d’état. According to 
(Halliru 2012), prior to 1980, only two ethno-religious and political conflicts occurred in 
Northern Nigeria, that is, those of 1953 and 1966. But since the 1980s, over 50 ethno-religious 
and political conflicts were recorded with death tolls in the hundreds of thousands. 
 
There are multifaceted sources of pressure for peace in Nigeria that range from inter-elite 
and inter-ethnic competitions as a result of the weak federal structure to real and imagined loss of 
traditional means of production coupled with: communal grievances via the perception of 
unequal treatment, resistance to state violence, and an abridgement of access to and exclusion 
from profitable sources of livelihood (Onimajesin 2008; Nnoli 2003b; Ibeanu 2003). 
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In short, conflicts in Nigeria manifest in five basic forms:  
 
 
• inter-ethnic (struggle over who controls certain spheres of influence; historical disputes 
over land and sources of pasture; fears of domination and marginalisation; disputes over 
access to economic and political power; hegemonic control national apparatuses of 
economic and political power; formation of ethnic militias);  
 
• intra-ethnic (land disputes; disagreement over the location of governmental offices, 
especially local government headquarters; dispute over the distribution of government 
patronage);  
 
• religious (religious bigotry; political sharia; extremist religious groups.);  
 
• political (disputes over the location of government offices; perceptions of being 
politically marginalized; manipulation of electoral process; political intolerance); and  
 
• hybrid that cuts across these spectra (poverty; anti-people economic reforms)  
 
 
And interestingly, their nature ranges from being diffused to being concentrated, and what this 
implies is that certain conflicts have domino effects as they resonate through reprisal attacks, 
while others are localized and contained within a geo-space.  
 
Throughout the 1980s and downwards, conflicts in Nigeria were triggered by a variety of 
factors. The first was closed economic opportunities owing to state-sponsored economic reforms. 
The introduction of structural adjustment programme (SAP) in 1986 by General Ibrahim 
Babangida (1985-1993) had untoward effects on the income generation opportunities of the 
people. Many factories closed shop and industrial employment plummeted from 335,000 in 1985 
to 27,000 in the 1990s with widespread poverty distributed in the matrix of 71 percent being 
categorized as poor; 36 and 35 percent as core poor and moderately poor respectively 
(Onimajesin 2008; Babawale 2007). Similarly, in the period before 1999, poverty incidence was 
65.6 per cent, but as at 2012 it had climbed to 72.0. (NBS 2011; CBN 2012). Some scholars 
locate the various incidences of conflict to the prevalent poverty in Nigeria. Alozieuwa (2012), in 
the tradition of human needs perspective, links frustration to economic deprivation. 
 
The second factor was a hegemonic hold of the North on the politics of Nigeria. Whether it 
was the military or democratic regimes, the North dominated Nigeria's political development. 
The balkanization of Nigeria into states and local government areas (LGAs), which was initially 
justified as a strategy to bring the government closer to the people and for accelerated 
development, was subsequently converted into an instrument of domination.  
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Between 1976 and 1999, more states and LGAs were created which enhanced 
disproportionateness: from the 12-state structure erected in 1967, which enthroned equity 
between Northern and Southern Nigeria by giving each six states, the ratio became 
disproportional with the North having 19 states and 414 LGAs and the South, 17 states and 355 
LGAs (Egwaikhide et al 2009).  Thus, the constitutional provision of federal character 
configured to ensure the dispensation of fringe benefits to other ethnic groups is, ipso facto, 
anchored on injustice. Thus, northern domination was considered a zero-sum game that alienated 
and marginalized other ethnic groups. This mindset led Adams (2007); Onimajesin (2008) to 
attribute the emergence of militia groups, especially the OPC, as not only a reflection of the 
existence of perceived or real injustice but a strategy to contain it.  
 
The third factor was the feeling of relative deprivation among ethnic nationalities, which 
arose from economic marginalisation and resource control exclusion. Distortions in the revenue 
sharing arrangement coincided with the oil boom of the 1970s. But the issue of derivation 
principle has a long history that is rooted in the colonial era. The Chick Commission (1953), 
which was set up to prepare the groundwork for the revision of the Constitution that later became 
the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954, and decided that mining rents and royalties and the personal 
income tax would be shared through the derivation principle (Ahmad and Singh 2002). 
 
Sequel to this was the Raisman-Trees Commission, which was set up on October 10, 1957 
to examine revenue allocation and problems of taxation. It expanded the regions’ tax base by 
making personal income tax once again a regional tax and established a pooling account. A 
portion of each major revenue item was paid to the regions on the basis of derivation, to the 
federal government and into the distributable pool for sharing among all regions (Ojiakor 1981; 
Ahmad and Singh 2002). Another important component of the recommendations of this 
commission was the conferment of the power to appoint a revenue allocation review commission 
from time to time, outside the framework of the constitution review process. Ever since then, the 
revenue sharing arrangement underwent fitful changes with over five ad hoc committees set up 
to review the revenue sharing formula (Alade et al 2003; Anam-Ndu 2007; Egwaikhide et al 
2009). 
 
The fourth factor was the democratization and opening of political space. The struggle for 
political ascendancy among the elite spawned and exacerbated conflicts. Between 1999 and 
2012, Nigeria recorded more conflicts and death, in terms of rapidity, spread and intensity, than 
any other period in its history. Under the guise of ethnic irredentism and religious renaissance, 
conflicts which were patently political was pursued.  The pervasiveness of conflicts and 
associated deaths led Maier (2000:xx) to claim,   
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Nigerians from all walks of life are openly questioning whether 
their country should remain as one entity or discard the colonial 
borders and break apart into several states. Ethnic and religious 
prejudices have found fertile ground in Nigeria, where there is 
neither consensus nor a binding ideology  
 
 
The fifth was the allegation of political marginalisation among the various ethnic groups. 
Almost every ethnic group claimed it was their turn to produce the President. These agitations 
deepened animosity at the class and ethnic level.  The interpretation of the agitation for political 
positions especially the presidency, which was basically a class war, within the context of 
ethnicity in a polarised polity. The cumulative effect was that the country was put on a keg of 
gunpowder as militant ethnic organisations emerged to defend the status quo and to stampede 
change. 
 
The most recent manifestation of aggression against the state, and which appears 
intractable, is the Boko Haram terrorist insurgency. Although the origin of the Boko Haram is 
mired in conflicting speculations, its descent into extremism is connected with its intention to 
overthrow and Islamize the Nigerian state (Onuoha 2012). The Nigerian president, Goodluck 
Jonathan, underscored the seriousness of the Boko Haram menace when he acknowledged that 
sympathizers of the sect populated his administration (Adetayo 2012). The peculiarity of the 
Boko Haram insurgency is the eclectic nature of its operations and the haziness in the parameters 
of determining its targets. With the media coming under bomb attacks and threats of bomb 
attacks, it has been cowered and hamstrung to engage in investigative journalism that could 
expose the operations of Boko Haram. This disposition of the Nigerian media led Haruna 
(2012:np) to posit that the coverage of the Boko Haram insurgency and wider religious and 
ethnic conflicts by has been “more propagandist than factual and objective [as the media] 
behaved more as weapons of mass deception for ideological and commercial reasons, than as 
weapons of mass education of the people about the complexity [of] Nigeria”. 
 
 
The Media, Elite Politics and Paradox of Peace Engineering  
 
The Nigerian media originated as a tool for social action in the heydays of colonialism. 
Thus, the press, which was its earliest department, symbolized a hybrid tool for social crusade, 
radical nationalism, commercial enterprise and the voice of the masses. Using the strategies of 
editorial and column writing, the Nigerian press of that era pursued its agenda-setting role as the 
conscience of the society. As Obafemi (2008:np) observes, “one of the most significant functions 
of the press lies in the power of its editorial comments in influencing socio-political development 
since the colonial days”. Contemporaneously, the media introduced feature writing and “special 
project adverts” to deepen its agenda-setting role.  
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The media is more effective now than ever, especially with expansions in the information 
and communication technology (ICT) and the new social media. Today, information is shared in 
split seconds around the globe, making the world truly a global village. As part of the domestic 
and international system, the role of the media in socio-economic, cultural and political 
development is not in doubt: the media has, at every point in history, stood to be counted. As 
Salawu (2009:75) opines, “the media as a social institution are also involved in conflicts in the 
society either as a harbinger, channel of information and analysis of the conflicts, or as part of 
the escalation or resolution of the conflicts”. This is so because the media and its decision 
making apparatus are part and parcel of the society and are not enamoured of the values that 
might dictate partisanship in societal conflicts.  
 
In Nigeria, the media is stuck in a class war. The nature of accumulation and the character 
of the Nigerian elite could not have spawned a different scenario for the media. The media is yet 
another tool in the arsenal of the Nigerian elite to further their predatory appropriation of the 
state. Ikpeze, Soludo and Elekwa (2004:342) put it in proper perspective, 
 
 
In a country like Nigeria where the prizes are so few, and the 
stakes so high, the fight for booty or “national cake” is fierce and 
often vicious. “Who gains, who loses in these federal, state and 
local policy arenas is rarely an accident. More often than not, the 
distributional consequences of public policies are the intended 
result of the private interests… .” 
 
 
The culture of peace is neither wished nor decreed, but consciously worked out and 
enthroned. The seeming failure of Nigerian federalism to deploy its essential attributes to spawn 
the right environment for the realization of ethnic dreams and aspirations appears to be the basis 
of the endless conflicts in the polity. This failure finds expression in ethnic exclusivity; the 
mindset that each ethnic group must struggle for its own share of the national cake, no matter 
how defined (Onimajesin 2008). 
 
Thus, the media, with its reach and socialising attributes, has been deployed to help in the 
propaganda necessary to maintain ethnic boundaries. That is why the media ownership 
composition reflects ethnic cleavages. As such, the core interests of the elite media-preneur tend 
to determine the editorial slant of the various media establishments. The implication is that social 
action is seen from the prism of ethnicity, and the media is used as a negotiating chip in the state-
wide power game. Therefore, the quest to entrench a culture of peace must start from repairing 
the structural imperfections that ascribe primacy to primordial ties.  
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The distribution of the media, apart from their disproportionate concentration in Lagos, 
shows their regional leaning. On practically any issue, the interpretation and editorial slant of the 
individual media outfits belie their impartiality. The slant is often tarred with the brush of 
ethnicity. Depending issue, the northern newspapers such as Trust, Leadership and New Nigerian 
do not see issues from the perspective of the Lagos-Ibadan newspapers.  There has been a 
longstanding tradition of newspapers following the trends and preponderance of opinions 
popular with their affiliated ethnic and religious groups. For instance, following the mindless 
orgy of destruction as a result of the indiscretion of Thisday newspaper, which triggered what 
later came to be tagged Miss World riots in 2002, Nigerian newspapers were sharply divided. 
While the southern media condemned the riots, the northern media rationalized it and almost 
haloed it (Salawu 2009).  
 
The same trend characterizes the reportage of, and critical commentaries on, the Boko 
Haram mayhem. The thrust of northern newspapers tends to locate the underpinning impetus to 
Boko Haram’s ascendancy on the failure of government to engineer socio-economic engagement 
of youth (Ekwueme & Obayi 2012). The paternalistic rationalization of Boko Haram by northern 
media and the critical reportage by their southern counterparts made the latter the target of 
attacks: on 26 April 2012, the Boko Haram sect bombed the offices of Thisday, The Moment and 
Daily Sun newspapers in both Abuja and Kaduna. Thus, the entrenchment of a culture of peace 
in Nigeria must start with addressing the key challenges to peace as well as transcend the ethnic 
fault lines. Haruna (2012:np) epitomizes the partisanship of commentaries along ethnic and 
religious lines when he asserted, “no doubt Boko Haram poses an existential threat to Nigerians 
and to Nigeria itself. But it is not the only existential threat facing Nigerians and their country. 
And properly isolated it is not even the most serious threat”. The bifurcation of the media along 
ethnic and religious lines as well as tinting commentaries to gloss over obvious threats to 
national peace is antithetical to peace. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The relevance of the media in enthroning a culture of peace is beyond doubt. But the media 
cannot do it in isolation. The traditional institutions of inculcating the basic societal culture have 
varying roles to play. An enduring strategy will require a three-pronged approach that must start 
with dismantling certain systemic structures that glamorize violence, strengthening the 
framework for punishment and setting up institutions that will promote and fast track ethno-
national integration outside the existing framework.  
 
Rather than project and elevate the media as the conscience of the society, the elite have 
deployed it as part of the ensembles of their warfare. Worse still, the media organizations operate 
from the parochial prism of ethnicity and religion, thus compounding the dilemma of cultivating 
the national ethos that can be a promoter of peace. 
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